update osm

.claude/settings.local.json

@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
 {
   "permissions": {
     "allow": [
-      "Bash(npm run *)"
+      "Bash(npm run *)",
+      "Bash(npm audit *)",
+      "Bash(node --check server.cjs)",
+      "Bash(node --check webhook.cjs)",
+      "Bash(node --check ecosystem.config.cjs)"
     ]
   }
 }

README.md

@@ -45,7 +45,11 @@ locally and only proxies the API routes used by the app:
 
 The proxy blocks cross-origin/API-navigation requests, strips CORS headers from
 the upstream response, rate limits callers, and caches successful GET responses
-briefly so public page traffic does not hammer the upstream API.
+briefly so public page traffic does not hammer the upstream API. All responses
+ship `X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, `Referrer-Policy`,
+`Permissions-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy`,
+HSTS (over HTTPS), and HTML responses include a Content Security Policy that
+allows only Cloudflare Turnstile and the CARTO basemap tiles.
 
 Override the API target before starting PM2 if needed:
 
@@ -68,6 +72,22 @@ API_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS=60000
 API_RATE_LIMIT_MAX=120
 ```
 
+## Reverse proxy / Cloudflare
+
+The server only honours `CF-Connecting-IP`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`,
+and the Cloudflare geolocation headers when the immediate TCP peer is listed in
+`TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS`. Bind the server to `127.0.0.1` (or leave it on `0.0.0.0`
+behind a firewall) and front it with nginx/Cloudflare for the configuration to
+take effect:
+
+```sh
+TRUST_PROXY=cloudflare
+TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS=127.0.0.1,::1,::ffff:127.0.0.1
+```
+
+Set `TRUST_PROXY=none` if the server is exposed directly. Without it, an attacker
+that reaches the app port can spoof client-IP headers to bypass rate limiting.
+
 ## Uptime snapshots
 
 The production server samples uptime every 30 minutes and exposes the history at
@@ -120,14 +140,32 @@ setup, and actual data fields.
 The webhook process listens on port `3011` at `/github`. Configure GitHub to send
 push events there.
 
-Set a webhook secret before starting PM2 if you want signature validation:
+A webhook secret is required — without `GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, the webhook
+rejects every request:
 
 ```sh
 GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET=your-secret pm2 start ecosystem.config.cjs
 ```
 
 On PowerShell, set `$env:GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET = "your-secret"` before starting
-PM2, or put the value directly in `ecosystem.config.cjs`.
+PM2, or put the value in a `.env` file in the project root (recommended over
+inlining the secret in a shell command, which writes it to shell history).
+
+The webhook only deploys pushes whose `ref` is in `GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REFS`
+(default `refs/heads/main`). Optionally pin the repository:
+
+```sh
+GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REFS=refs/heads/main
+GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REPOSITORY=owner/repo
+```
+
+Deploys run `npm ci` (not `npm install`) so an attacker who compromises a
+dependency cannot quietly add new packages — the lockfile is the source of
+truth.
+
+Set `DISCORD_INCLUDE_PATCH=true` only if the Discord channel is private; by
+default the patch preview is omitted from Discord notifications to avoid
+leaking diff contents.
 
 The default deploy flow is:
 

ecosystem.config.cjs

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ module.exports = {
         API_CACHE_TTL_MS: process.env.API_CACHE_TTL_MS || 15000,
         API_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS: process.env.API_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS || 60000,
         API_RATE_LIMIT_MAX: process.env.API_RATE_LIMIT_MAX || 120,
+        TRUST_PROXY: process.env.TRUST_PROXY || 'cloudflare',
+        TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS: process.env.TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS || '127.0.0.1,::1,::ffff:127.0.0.1',
+        TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY: process.env.TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY || '',
       },
     },
     {
@@ -27,8 +30,11 @@ module.exports = {
         NODE_ENV: 'production',
         WEBHOOK_PORT: process.env.WEBHOOK_PORT || 3011,
         GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET: process.env.GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET || '',
+        GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REFS: process.env.GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REFS || 'refs/heads/main',
+        GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REPOSITORY: process.env.GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REPOSITORY || '',
         PM2_RESTART_TARGETS: process.env.PM2_RESTART_TARGETS || 'tssbot-web',
         DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL: process.env.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL || '',
+        DISCORD_INCLUDE_PATCH: process.env.DISCORD_INCLUDE_PATCH || 'false',
       },
     },
   ],

example.env

@@ -14,12 +14,26 @@ API_CACHE_TTL_MS=15000
 API_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS=60000
 API_RATE_LIMIT_MAX=120
 
+# Proxy trust. Set to "cloudflare" when the app is fronted by Cloudflare (possibly via nginx).
+# "generic" trusts X-Forwarded-* without CF-specific headers. "none" ignores all proxy headers.
+# Only honors trusted headers when the immediate TCP peer is in TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS.
+TRUST_PROXY=cloudflare
+TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS=127.0.0.1,::1,::ffff:127.0.0.1
+
 WEBHOOK_PORT=3011
 GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET=change-me
+# Comma-separated refs allowed to trigger a deploy. Defaults to refs/heads/main.
+GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REFS=refs/heads/main
+# Optional: refuse pushes whose repository.full_name does not match (e.g. "owner/repo").
+GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REPOSITORY=
 PM2_RESTART_TARGETS=tssbot-web
 DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL=https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...
+# Set to "true" only if the Discord channel is private. Default omits the patch preview
+# from Discord notifications to avoid leaking diffs (including any inline secrets).
+DISCORD_INCLUDE_PATCH=true
 
 # Cloudflare Turnstile. VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY is the public site key baked into the client bundle by Vite.
 # TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is the server-only secret used to call the Siteverify endpoint.
+# If left blank, the gated deletion endpoint is open (no challenge enforced). Set both to enforce.
 VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY=
 TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY=

server.cjs

@@ -60,6 +60,85 @@ const MAX_CACHE_ENTRIES = 200
 const MAX_RATE_LIMIT_KEYS = 1000
 const MAX_ANALYTICS_BODY_BYTES = 16 * 1024
 
+const TRUST_PROXY = (() => {
+  const raw = String(process.env.TRUST_PROXY ?? 'cloudflare').trim().toLowerCase()
+  if (raw === '' || raw === 'false' || raw === '0' || raw === 'none') return 'none'
+  if (raw === 'cloudflare' || raw === 'cf') return 'cloudflare'
+  if (raw === 'true' || raw === '1' || raw === 'any' || raw === 'generic') return 'generic'
+  return 'none'
+})()
+
+const TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS = new Set(
+  String(process.env.TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS ?? '127.0.0.1,::1,::ffff:127.0.0.1')
+    .split(',')
+    .map((ip) => ip.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean),
+)
+
+function requestPeerIsTrusted(req) {
+  if (TRUST_PROXY === 'none') return false
+  if (!TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS.size) return true
+  const peer = req.socket.remoteAddress || ''
+  return TRUSTED_UPSTREAM_IPS.has(peer)
+}
+
+const ANALYTICS_METADATA_ALLOWED_KEYS = new Set([
+  'preferences',
+  'request',
+  'screen',
+  'viewport',
+  'pixelRatio',
+  'colorDepth',
+  'network',
+  'privacy',
+  'capability',
+  'capabilities',
+  'memory',
+  'cpu',
+  'touch',
+  'hardware',
+  'locale',
+  'referrer',
+])
+
+const SECURITY_HEADERS_BASE = {
+  'x-content-type-options': 'nosniff',
+  'x-frame-options': 'DENY',
+  'referrer-policy': 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
+  'permissions-policy': 'accelerometer=(), camera=(), geolocation=(), gyroscope=(), magnetometer=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()',
+  'cross-origin-opener-policy': 'same-origin',
+  'cross-origin-resource-policy': 'same-origin',
+}
+
+const CSP_DIRECTIVES = [
+  "default-src 'self'",
+  "base-uri 'self'",
+  "form-action 'self'",
+  "frame-ancestors 'none'",
+  "object-src 'none'",
+  "script-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com",
+  "script-src-elem 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com",
+  "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+  "img-src 'self' data: blob: https://*.basemaps.cartocdn.com https://basemaps.cartocdn.com",
+  "font-src 'self' data:",
+  "connect-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com",
+  "frame-src https://challenges.cloudflare.com",
+  "worker-src 'self' blob:",
+  "manifest-src 'self'",
+  'upgrade-insecure-requests',
+].join('; ')
+
+function securityHeaders(req, { html = false } = {}) {
+  const headers = { ...SECURITY_HEADERS_BASE }
+  if (isHttpsRequest(req)) {
+    headers['strict-transport-security'] = 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains'
+  }
+  if (html) {
+    headers['content-security-policy'] = CSP_DIRECTIVES
+  }
+  return headers
+}
+
 const mimeTypes = {
   '.css': 'text/css; charset=utf-8',
   '.html': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
@@ -75,7 +154,8 @@ const mimeTypes = {
 }
 
 function send(res, status, body, headers = {}) {
-  res.writeHead(status, headers)
+  const merged = { ...securityHeaders(res.req || { socket: {}, headers: {} }), ...headers }
+  res.writeHead(status, merged)
   res.end(body)
 }
 
@@ -363,17 +443,57 @@ function startUptimeSampler() {
   }, UPTIME_SAMPLE_INTERVAL_MS).unref()
 }
 
+function trustedHeaderFirst(req, name) {
+  const value = req.headers[name]
+  if (!value) return ''
+  return String(Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value).split(',')[0].trim()
+}
+
+function trustedForwardedProto(req) {
+  if (!requestPeerIsTrusted(req)) {
+    return req.socket.encrypted ? 'https' : 'http'
+  }
+  if (TRUST_PROXY === 'cloudflare') {
+    const cfVisitor = trustedHeaderFirst(req, 'cf-visitor')
+    if (cfVisitor) {
+      try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(cfVisitor)
+        if (parsed && typeof parsed.scheme === 'string') return parsed.scheme.toLowerCase()
+      } catch {
+        // ignore malformed cf-visitor
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return (
+    trustedHeaderFirst(req, 'x-forwarded-proto').toLowerCase() ||
+    (req.socket.encrypted ? 'https' : 'http')
+  )
+}
+
+function trustedForwardedHost(req) {
+  if (requestPeerIsTrusted(req) && TRUST_PROXY === 'generic') {
+    const value = trustedHeaderFirst(req, 'x-forwarded-host')
+    if (value) return value
+  }
+  return trustedHeaderFirst(req, 'host')
+}
+
+function isHttpsRequest(req) {
+  if (req.socket.encrypted) return true
+  return trustedForwardedProto(req) === 'https'
+}
+
 function publicOrigins(req) {
   const origins = PUBLIC_ORIGIN.split(',')
     .map((origin) => origin.trim())
     .filter(Boolean)
 
   if (!origins.length) {
-    const host = req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] || req.headers.host
-    const proto = req.headers['x-forwarded-proto'] || (req.socket.encrypted ? 'https' : 'http')
+    const host = trustedForwardedHost(req)
+    const proto = trustedForwardedProto(req) || (req.socket.encrypted ? 'https' : 'http')
 
     if (host) {
-      origins.push(`${proto}://${String(host).split(',')[0].trim()}`)
+      origins.push(`${proto}://${host}`)
     }
   }
 
@@ -406,8 +526,14 @@ function isSameOriginRequest(req) {
 }
 
 function clientIp(req) {
-  const forwardedFor = req.headers['x-forwarded-for']
-  if (forwardedFor) return String(forwardedFor).split(',')[0].trim()
+  if (requestPeerIsTrusted(req)) {
+    if (TRUST_PROXY === 'cloudflare') {
+      const cf = trustedHeaderFirst(req, 'cf-connecting-ip')
+      if (cf) return cf
+    }
+    const forwarded = trustedHeaderFirst(req, 'x-forwarded-for')
+    if (forwarded) return forwarded
+  }
   return req.socket.remoteAddress || 'unknown'
 }
 
@@ -428,6 +554,7 @@ function headerValue(req, name, maxLength = 200) {
 }
 
 function countryFromHeaders(req) {
+  if (!requestPeerIsTrusted(req)) return ''
   const raw =
     headerValue(req, 'cf-ipcountry', 12) ||
     headerValue(req, 'x-vercel-ip-country', 12) ||
@@ -445,6 +572,9 @@ function numberHeader(req, name, min, max) {
 }
 
 function locationFromHeaders(req) {
+  if (!requestPeerIsTrusted(req) || TRUST_PROXY !== 'cloudflare') {
+    return { country: countryFromHeaders(req), region: '', city: '', latitude: null, longitude: null }
+  }
   return {
     country: countryFromHeaders(req),
     region: headerValue(req, 'cf-region', 120),
@@ -454,8 +584,46 @@ function locationFromHeaders(req) {
   }
 }
 
+function sanitizeAnalyticsValue(value, depth = 0) {
+  if (depth > 3) return null
+  if (value == null) return null
+  if (typeof value === 'string') return value.slice(0, 500)
+  if (typeof value === 'number') return Number.isFinite(value) ? value : null
+  if (typeof value === 'boolean') return value
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    return value.slice(0, 24).map((item) => sanitizeAnalyticsValue(item, depth + 1)).filter((item) => item !== null)
+  }
+  if (typeof value === 'object') {
+    const out = {}
+    let kept = 0
+    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
+      if (kept >= 32) break
+      const cleanKey = String(key).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_\-]/g, '').slice(0, 60)
+      if (!cleanKey) continue
+      const cleanVal = sanitizeAnalyticsValue(val, depth + 1)
+      if (cleanVal === null) continue
+      out[cleanKey] = cleanVal
+      kept += 1
+    }
+    return out
+  }
+  return null
+}
+
+function pruneAnalyticsMetadata(raw) {
+  if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object' || Array.isArray(raw)) return {}
+  const out = {}
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(raw)) {
+    if (!ANALYTICS_METADATA_ALLOWED_KEYS.has(key)) continue
+    const sanitized = sanitizeAnalyticsValue(value, 0)
+    if (sanitized === null) continue
+    out[key] = sanitized
+  }
+  return out
+}
+
 function analyticsMetadata(req, payload) {
-  const metadata = payload.metadata && typeof payload.metadata === 'object' ? payload.metadata : {}
+  const metadata = pruneAnalyticsMetadata(payload.metadata)
   const preferences = metadata.preferences && typeof metadata.preferences === 'object'
     ? metadata.preferences
     : {}
@@ -536,14 +704,18 @@ function readJsonBody(req) {
   })
 }
 
-const TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE = 'tssbot_turnstile'
+const TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE_BASE = 'tssbot_turnstile'
+const TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE_HOST = `__Host-${TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE_BASE}`
 const TURNSTILE_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 60
-const TURNSTILE_SESSION_HMAC_KEY = crypto
+const TURNSTILE_SESSION_HMAC_KEY = TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY
+  ? crypto
       .createHash('sha256')
       .update(`tssbot-turnstile-session|${TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY}`)
       .digest()
+  : null
 
 function signTurnstileSession(expiresAt) {
+  if (!TURNSTILE_SESSION_HMAC_KEY) return ''
   return crypto
     .createHmac('sha256', TURNSTILE_SESSION_HMAC_KEY)
     .update(String(expiresAt))
@@ -551,13 +723,14 @@ function signTurnstileSession(expiresAt) {
 }
 
 function buildTurnstileSessionCookie(req) {
+  if (!TURNSTILE_SESSION_HMAC_KEY) return ''
   const expiresAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + TURNSTILE_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS
   const signature = signTurnstileSession(expiresAt)
   const value = `${expiresAt}.${signature}`
-  const proto = req.headers['x-forwarded-proto'] || (req.socket.encrypted ? 'https' : 'http')
-  const isHttps = String(proto).split(',')[0].trim() === 'https'
+  const isHttps = isHttpsRequest(req)
+  const name = isHttps ? TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE_HOST : TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE_BASE
   const parts = [
-    `${TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE}=${value}`,
+    `${name}=${value}`,
     'Path=/',
     `Max-Age=${TURNSTILE_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS}`,
     'HttpOnly',
@@ -581,8 +754,10 @@ function parseRequestCookies(req) {
 
 function isTurnstileSessionVerified(req) {
   if (!TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY) return true
+  if (!TURNSTILE_SESSION_HMAC_KEY) return false
   const cookies = parseRequestCookies(req)
-  const cookie = cookies[TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE]
+  const cookie =
+    cookies[TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE_HOST] || cookies[TURNSTILE_SESSION_COOKIE_BASE]
   if (!cookie) return false
   const dot = cookie.indexOf('.')
   if (dot < 1) return false
@@ -591,7 +766,7 @@ function isTurnstileSessionVerified(req) {
   const expiresAt = Number(expiresAtStr)
   if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt < Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)) return false
   const expected = signTurnstileSession(expiresAt)
-  if (signature.length !== expected.length) return false
+  if (!expected || signature.length !== expected.length) return false
   try {
     return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(signature), Buffer.from(expected))
   } catch {
@@ -1372,12 +1547,15 @@ function proxyRequest(req, res) {
     (proxyRes) => {
       const headers = {
         ...proxyRes.headers,
+        ...securityHeaders(req),
         'cache-control': 'private, max-age=15',
-        'x-content-type-options': 'nosniff',
       }
 
       delete headers['access-control-allow-origin']
       delete headers['access-control-allow-credentials']
+      delete headers['access-control-allow-methods']
+      delete headers['access-control-allow-headers']
+      delete headers['access-control-expose-headers']
 
       res.writeHead(proxyRes.statusCode || 502, headers)
 
@@ -1420,6 +1598,7 @@ function pagePublicOrigin(req) {
 function sendHtml(req, res, data, status = 200) {
   const html = data.toString('utf8').replaceAll('__PUBLIC_ORIGIN__', pagePublicOrigin(req))
   send(res, status, html, {
+    ...securityHeaders(req, { html: true }),
     'content-type': mimeTypes['.html'],
     'cache-control': 'no-cache',
   })
@@ -1468,6 +1647,10 @@ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
   }
 
   if (req.method === 'GET' && req.url === '/api/uptime') {
+    if (isRateLimited(req)) {
+      sendJson(res, 429, { error: 'Too many requests' }, { 'retry-after': String(Math.ceil(API_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS / 1000)) })
+      return
+    }
     uptimeHistory()
       .then((data) => sendJson(res, 200, data))
       .catch((error) => sendJson(res, 500, { error: 'Uptime history unavailable', detail: error.message }))
@@ -1475,6 +1658,10 @@ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
   }
 
   if (req.method === 'GET' && req.url === '/api/viewers') {
+    if (isRateLimited(req)) {
+      sendJson(res, 429, { error: 'Too many requests' }, { 'retry-after': String(Math.ceil(API_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS / 1000)) })
+      return
+    }
     try {
       sendJson(res, 200, viewerDashboard())
     } catch (error) {
@@ -1555,6 +1742,10 @@ const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
   }
 
   if (req.method === 'GET' && req.url === '/api/turnstile/session') {
+    if (!isSameOriginRequest(req)) {
+      sendJson(res, 403, { error: 'Turnstile session check is restricted to this site' })
+      return
+    }
     sendJson(res, 200, { verified: isTurnstileSessionVerified(req) })
     return
   }

webhook.cjs

@@ -39,10 +39,18 @@ loadEnvFile()
 const PORT = Number(process.env.WEBHOOK_PORT || 3011)
 const SECRET = process.env.GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET || ''
 const DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL = process.env.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL || ''
+const DISCORD_INCLUDE_PATCH = /^(1|true|yes)$/i.test(String(process.env.DISCORD_INCLUDE_PATCH || ''))
 const RESTART_TARGETS = (process.env.PM2_RESTART_TARGETS || 'tssbot-web')
   .split(',')
   .map((target) => target.trim())
   .filter(Boolean)
+const ALLOWED_REFS = new Set(
+  (process.env.GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REFS || 'refs/heads/main')
+    .split(',')
+    .map((ref) => ref.trim())
+    .filter(Boolean),
+)
+const ALLOWED_REPOSITORY = (process.env.GITHUB_WEBHOOK_REPOSITORY || '').trim()
 const RESTART_AFTER_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
 
 let deploying = false
@@ -86,7 +94,10 @@ function validGitSha(value) {
 }
 
 function verifySignature(rawBody, signature) {
-  if (!SECRET) return true
+  if (!SECRET) {
+    console.error('GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET is not set — rejecting webhook')
+    return false
+  }
   if (!signature || !signature.startsWith('sha256=')) return false
 
   const expected = `sha256=${crypto.createHmac('sha256', SECRET).update(rawBody).digest('hex')}`
@@ -160,12 +171,14 @@ function runCapture(command, args, options = {}) {
 }
 
 async function ensureBuildDependencies() {
-  await run('npm', ['install', '--production=false', '--include=dev', '--include=optional'], {
+  await run('npm', ['ci', '--include=dev', '--include=optional'], {
     env: {
       NODE_ENV: 'development',
       npm_config_include: 'dev,optional',
       npm_config_omit: '',
       npm_config_production: 'false',
+      npm_config_fund: 'false',
+      npm_config_audit: 'false',
     },
   })
 
@@ -301,7 +314,7 @@ function diffFields(diff) {
   if (diff.summary) {
     fields.push({ name: 'Diff summary', value: codeBlock(diff.summary, 'diff'), inline: false })
   }
-  if (diff.patch) {
+  if (DISCORD_INCLUDE_PATCH && diff.patch) {
     fields.push({ name: 'Patch preview', value: codeBlock(diff.patch, 'diff'), inline: false })
   }
 
@@ -388,6 +401,25 @@ http
         return
       }
 
+      const pushRef = String(push?.ref || '')
+      if (!ALLOWED_REFS.has(pushRef)) {
+        json(res, 202, { skipped: true, reason: `Ignoring ref ${pushRef || '(missing)'}` })
+        return
+      }
+
+      if (ALLOWED_REPOSITORY) {
+        const repoFullName = String(push?.repository?.full_name || '')
+        if (repoFullName !== ALLOWED_REPOSITORY) {
+          json(res, 202, { skipped: true, reason: `Ignoring repository ${repoFullName || '(missing)'}` })
+          return
+        }
+      }
+
+      if (push?.deleted) {
+        json(res, 202, { skipped: true, reason: 'Ignoring branch-delete push' })
+        return
+      }
+
       if (deploying) {
         json(res, 202, { queued: false, deploying: true })
         return